Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods: Reasonableness Revisited by Walkowiak, Vincent S.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 2
1979
Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of
Defective Goods: Reasonableness Revisited
Vincent S. Walkowiak
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




AND THE CONCEPT OF DEFECTIVE GOODS:
"REASONABLENESS" REVISITED?
VINCENT S. WALKOWIAK*
It must be understood that the words "unreasonably dangerous"
have no independent significance and merely represent a label to
be used where it is determined that the risk of loss should be
placed upon the supplier.'
W HEN THE NEW YORK Court of Appeals in MacPherson
v Buick Motor Co.' eliminated the requirement that a
plaintiff establish privity of contract with a manufacturer before
bringing a negligence suit for personal injuries caused by a defec-
tive product, they ushered in the modem era of products liability.
The variety of devices available to the plaintiff to establish the fault,
and therefore liability, of a manufacturer for manufacturing flaws
steadily increased.! Initial satisfaction with the efficiency of such
procedural devices as res ipsa loquitur to shift the costs of com-
pensating for injuries, however, slowly wore off and pro-plaintiff
jurists gradually began questioning even substantive rules of lia-
bility. By 1944, Judge Traynor, in a concurring opinion in Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,' stated:
In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference [created by
res ipsa loquitur] has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence
against it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability.
It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery
* B.A., 1968; J.D., 1971, University of Illinois; Associate Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University. Copyright © 1979 Vincent S. Walkowiak and
SMU School of Law.
I Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., - Pa. , 391 A.2d 1020, 1025 (1978).
2217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
' See Gilliam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1957).
424 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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and impose what is in reality liability without negligence...'
Thirteen years later, Professor Fleming James also questioned
whether manufacturers should be liable for injuries caused by
their products in the absence of negligence." In the twenty years
since James stated the question, courts have been consistently
answering his inquiry in the affirmative.7 As a result, injury losses
'150 P.2d at 441. Justice Traynor did however acknowledge that a manu-
facturer may offer evidence to rebut this inference and where the evidence is
clear, positive, and uncontradicted, the manufacturer may even be entitled to a
directed verdict. Id.
6 James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negli-
gence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 924 (1957). See also James, Products Liability,
34 TEx. L. REv. 44, 192 (1955); Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE
L. J. 1099 (1960).
7 Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Clary v.
Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969); 0. S. Stapley Co.
v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Bradford v. Bendix-
Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406
(1973); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 290, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Nacci v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 325 A.2d 617 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95
Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Cornette v. Searjeant Metals Prod. Inc., 147 Ind. App.
46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191
(10th Cir. 1974) (applying Kansas law); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Dist.
Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966); Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d
926 (La. 1978); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955
(1976); Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich. App. 708, 202 N.W.2d
727 (1972); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488
(1967); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Keener
v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Brandenburger v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Kohler v. Ford
Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601. (1971); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard
& Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Scanlon v. General Motors
Corp. 65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730,
497 P.2d 732 (1972); Goldberg v. Kollsman Inst. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191
N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 592 (1963); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio
St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521
P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d
624 (1965); Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893
(1975); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971);
Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973); Ford Motor
Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975); Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288 (10th Cir.
1977) (applying Utah law); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452
P.2d 729 (1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967);
Maxled v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974). Strict lia-
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once borne by individual users and consumers of products have
been shifted increasingly to the sellers and manufacturers of those
products. The question to be addressed by this article is whether
that shift has improved the overall workings of our tort loss dis-
tribution system.
I. THEORIES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Although early non-negligence products liability theory was
often couched in terms of warranties, the advent of strict liability
marked the decline of contract warranty as the sole basis of the
cause of action. A development concurrent with the judicial crea-
tion of strict liability was the almost total absorption of the war-
ranty action into the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) as that
statute gained increased legislative acceptance. In the early stages
of the theoretical development of the concept of strict liability for
product related injuries, a pitched battle was waged between the
theorists who favored the common law development of the strict
liability action and those who argued legislative preemption by the
UCC.' There remains a hard core of activists who continue to argue
persuasively that the courts abused their common law prerogatives
in adopting the doctrine of strict liability in tort' while ignoring a
legitimate legislative enactment which defined non-negligence lia-
bility for products; however, the position that the warranty sections
of Article Two of the UCC preempt the field is of only mild his-
torical interest at this point."0
bility has been assumed to be a viable doctrine in North Carolina. Coffer v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534, 539 (1976).
A strongly contrary position has been asserted by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Swartz v. General Motors Corp., - Mass. _ 378 N.E.2d 61 (1978).
There has also been legislative adoption of the concept of strict liability as
a cause of action. See GA. CoDE, tit. 105 §§ 1-13a (1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
art. 14 S 221 (1973); S.C. CODE § 15-73-10 (1977).
' See generally, James, supra note 6, Prosser, supra note 6, Titus, Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 713 (1970); Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts
Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV.
123 (1974).
'See generally Shanker, A Case of Judicial Chutzpah, (The Judicial Adoption
of Strict Tort Products Liability Theory), 11 AKRON L. REV. 697 (1978).
I0As the court stated in Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244
(Alas. 1969), in rejecting the defendants' contention that the UCC governed the
plaintiffs' cause of action:
The argument is that the law of sales contract warranties as con-
1979]
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The Supreme Court of California provided the initial justification
for disregarding the UCC in this area when the court in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.," stated:
[S]trict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express
or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plain-
tiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between
them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement
but imposed by law [citations omitted], and the refusal to permit
the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for
defective products [citations omitted], make clear that the liability
is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the
law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining and gov-
erning warranties that were developed to meet the needs of com-
mercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the
manufacturers' liability to those injured by their defective products
unless those rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is
imposed.'
The arguments that such rules as were adopted by the drafters of
the UCC served such a purpose, no matter how well thought out
or artfully presented, were consistently rejected as pro-plaintiff
courts adopted the new doctrine of strict liability."
strued by the Courts affords the same protection to the consumer
as that provided by the rule of strict liability. We have considered
appellee's contentions but are of the view that the doctrine of strict
liability in tort as defined in Greenman affords the most logical, least
technical and most comprehensive coverage with respect to the
factual situations where it is applicable.
Id. at 248. See note 7 supra. But see Southwest Forest Indus. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970);
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 838 (1976).
1159 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
12377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (emphasis added).
13 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965). In defending its decision to adopt strict liability, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals recently stated:
[T]here still remain various other requirements and limitations im-
posed by contract law which may be encountered when pursuing
an action for breach of warranty but not when seeking damages
for injury caused by a defective product under the theory of strict
liability in tort.
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955, 961 (1976). But
cf. Back v. Wicker Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1978) (Massachusetts UCC
amended to incorporate the strict liability action eliminating the need for judicial
adoption of the theory).
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The doctrine of strict liability, then, was a doctrine of tort law
which would have to be interpreted with and contrasted to other
theories of tort liability. The courts, in the exercise of their author-
ity to contribute to the growth of the common law, had the right
to create this new cause of action because they had the power to
create it. Although the courts did not have the legislatures' re-
sources prior to creating and putting into effect this new theory
of liability, they conveniently answered this criticism by a reaffir-
mation of faith in the case-by-case common law system for resolu-
tion of the many interstitial questions presented by the adoption
of this theory of liability. ' And while the parameters and many of
the interstitial details of the theory are yet to be fashioned, much
has been done since the California Supreme Court first endorsed
the doctrine.15 Most critically, the doctrine has been expanded in
scope, requiring a re-evaluation of its impact upon tort loss dis-
tribution and the goals of liability imposition. This evaluation can
be accomplished by comparison and contrast to "fault" based
liability." It is the function of this paper to explore that comparison
and set forth those contrasts.
II. Loss DISTRIBUTION-NEGLIGENCE VERSUS STRICT LIABILITY
Fault based liability is imposed when an actor has fallen below
a legally defined standard of care. By adopting this standard of
care, society has accepted that injuries caused by actors who have
not fallen below the standard of care will remain uncompensated.
That is, to the extent that participating in a particular activity in
a particular fashion does not violate the legally defined standard
of care, society subsidizes that activity by requiring that the vic-
tims of the injuries which are the normal consequence of that
14See Greenberg v. Lorenz, 12 Misc. 2d 883, 178 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (Sup.
Ct. 1958); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305,
313 (1965).
'
3 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 877, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
" This reference to "fault" based liability is a comparison of the rules adopted
to effect "manufacturers strict liability" to the more familiar negligence standard
and does not mean to imply that strict liability as it affects products is intended
to be a doctrine totally removed from the "fault" based loss distribution mech-
anism. As will become clear, manufacturer's strict liability fulfills many of the
social goals set for fault based liability. See cases cited note 38 inIra.
1979]
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activity bear the costs of their own injuries. When the standard
of care is violated, the injuries legally and factually caused by the
violation of the standard of care become a cost of participation in
the activity. It is, of course, a societal decision at which level to
set the standard of care for participation in a given activity. For
most activities this is customarily the level of "reasonable care."'"
It is important to note that there is a dual or two-pronged pur-
pose for setting any standard for loss distribution. In fault based
liability, these dual purposes may be described as follows. In the
first prong, the actors participating in a given activity are theo-
retically deterred from falling below the established standard of
care by reason of the fear of financial liability for those injuries
which are caused by their breach of the minimum standard of
care. In theory, therefore, if deterrence is sufficient, the number
of injuries caused by actors falling below the standard of care is
reduced, since there are fewer actors who fall below the standard.'
1 
7 Thus, for example, if the legally defined standard of care happens to be
an established speed limit, and if a person's injuries are legally and factually
caused as a result of an actor's traveling in excess of that speed limit, then the
fault system would permit imposition of liability upon the actor. Conversely if the
person's injuries were factually and legally caused by the actor's traveling at
the speed limit, no compensation would be forthcoming; the injured party would
be expected to bear his own losses.
"8But cf. Reynolds, Strict Liability for Commercial Service-Will Another
Citadel Crumble?, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 298 (1977) (predicting elimination of the
reasonable care standard).
"That any form of tort loss distribution should have as one of its purposes
the deterrence of injuries is, of course, an a priori premise of fault based liability.
It is assumed that most, if not all actors are capable of meeting this standard
of care. Phrased differently, fault based liability assumes that the actor could
have prevented the injury producing event through some conduct over which the
actor had control.
A facile argument can be postulated that the "fault" lies simply in participat-
ing in the activity. However, in the absence of a declaration that the act of partici-
pation in the activity is itself fault-laden, this would form a basis for liability
only if some other standard of care had also been breached or if the basis for
liability is a standard related to conduct which is non-fault based. Nonethe-
less, in the single area which has engendered the largest interest regarding the
parameters to which fault-based liability is, or should be stretched, that of the
automobile driver, there is considerable evidence that a driver's ability may not
be responsible for automobile accidents, but that inherent human limitations on
drivers' abilities exist which may be exacerbated by environmental conditions or
debilitating agents such as carbon monoxide. U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., DRIVER
BEHAVIOR AND ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY
151-169 (1970). These conclusions militate toward better regulation of an enter-
prise to control injury producing conduct and the concomitant conclusion that
personal financial culpability for injuries caused by "error" will not be totally
PRODUCT LIABILITY
This has been described as the primary aspect of fault based lia-
bility.20 In order for primary deterrence to have a maximum im-
pact, of course, it should be addressed to the class of actors most
readily deterred from participating in "faulty" conduct. 1
The second aspect of fault based liability is secondary loss dis-
tribution. As noted, the result of imposing liability for only those
injuries which are caused by a breach of the standard of care is
that many injuries caused by an activity remain uncompensated
by a system of fault-based liability. Of these injuries, the system
takes no cognizance; but as to those injuries which do subject an
actor to liability, the second aspect of fault based liability, secon-
dary loss distribution, is involved.
In this second prong of the system of fault based liability, the
disruptive effects of tort-"caused" injuries are to be mitigated
when possible." That is, the most effective vehicle for loss trans-
ference is sought once the deterrent effects of the primary goal of
fault based liability have been exhausted. When primary injuries
have been reduced by the imposition of liability as low as they
can be reduced consistently with the standard of care which has
been adopted, then the crippling impact of economic loss which
will follow the imposition of financial liability should be reduced.
Thus, while fault based liability has a deterrent element, it does
not have a punitive element. Measuring the conduct of the actor
and comparing it to the objective standard of reasonable care as
is done in negligence, can be contrasted to and compared with
the standard-however defined-which is employed in strict lia-
bility in order to make the initial decision to shift losses.
Any analysis of strict liability of manufacturers as a loss dis-
effective to reduce injuries since "fault" is unrelated in many instances to any-
thing even closely resembling the moral culpability to which a deterrent rule
would be addressed.
2 See Walkowiak, Innocent Injury and Loss Distribution: The Florida Pure
Comparative Negligence System, 5 FLA. ST.U.L. REv. 66, 92 (1977) and refer-
ences cited therein.
2 See note 19 supra.
2Thus, rules which permit a tortfeasor to share liability with other tort-
feasors through contribution among joint tortfeasors are to be encouraged. See
Walkowiak, supra note 20. In addition, the purchase of liability insurance which
permits losses to be spread temporally and personally is also permitted. See
Walkowiak, Implied Indemnity: A Policy Analysis of the Tort Loss Shifting
Remedy in a Partial Loss Shifting Jurisdiction, 30 U. FLA.L. REv. 501, 534
(1978).
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tribution system should begin with a general review of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts §402A. This section provides in rele-
vant part that: "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user.., or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer ....
Under this standard, then, liability for injuries caused by prod-
ucts is imposed when the plaintiff establishes three elements: first,
that the product caused the injury; second, that the product was
defective when it left the defendant's premises; and, third, that
the product was unreasonably dangerous. While the Restatement's
definition of strict liability has not been universally followed, it
has been adopted in substantially this form by most jurisdictions
which recognize the strict liability cause of action. It serves, there-
fore, as a model with which to compare the theories of liability
applied in those jurisdictions which have adopted slightly modified
systems of strict liability.
As with fault or negligence, in strict liability a standard must
be established to which products may be compared; when the
products fall below the standard, liability may be imposed. If the
standard is not breached, although injury may follow, liability may
not be imposed." The bulk of the jurisdictions adopting a system
of strict liability for products have expressed that standard by
2RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
24 This is just another way of stating the proposition that strict product lia-
bility is not absolute liability for injuries caused by products. As one court stated:
Often the concept of strict liability is confused with liability that is
absolute. Such confusion is understandable when one compares
older editions of tort casebooks. The indexes of such books use the
heading of "Strict Liability" in reference to cases dealing with
absolute liability, e.g., Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 Hurl. & C. 774, L.R.
3 H.L. 330 (1868). See F. Bolen, Cases on Torts, 634 (4 Ed.
1941). "Some quibbler may allege that this is liability without fault.
It is not. As is made clear above, a plaintiff relying upon the rule
must prove a defect attributable to the manufacturer and causal
connection between that defect and the injury or damage of which
he complains. When able to do that, then and only then may he
recover against the manufacturer of the defective product." Pierce-
field v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129,
135 (1965).
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277, n.7 (8th Cir. 1972).
See also Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974); Vine-
yard v. Empire Mach. Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 581 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. App. 1978);
Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1974).
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stating that the product causing injuries must be found to have
been defective.' However, the standard to which the product is
compared in order to reach a determination that the product is
defective varies according to the nature of the alleged defect. While
the majority of the early products liability cases involved liability
for manufacturing defects, ' a product also may be found defective
if it contains a "design defect."
III. THE VARIETIES OF DEFECT
A. Manufacturing Defects
A cause of action in strict liability for a defectively manufactured
product is reasonably straightforward; indeed it was the simplicity
of the procedure that attracted pro-plaintiff jurists to it.2' The
standard for comparison of the allegedly defective product is pro-
vided by the manufacturer itself: a product contains a manufactur-
ing defect when it does not meet the performance or safety stand-
ards which the manufacturer has set for its product. Thus, a bottle
of soft drink which contains the decomposed remains of a rodent;"'
a stress member whose metal has not properly been cured causing
it to fail to perform to the standards set for it by the manufacturer;"
or the weight bearing member which fractures undetected during
manufacture;"0 all are defective. The fact finder can simply com-
pare the injury causing product to the average quality of the
manufacturers' normally produced products. Under the Restate-
2'But see Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978),
discussed infra note 39.
But see Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), in which the alleged violation of the standard of
care was inadequately designed and constructed set screws on a combination
power tool.
27 Thus, Justice Sullivan, speaking for the majority in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) could state:
"mhe very purpose of our pioneering efforts in this field [strict liability] was to
relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence . . .
and warranty . . . remedies. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 442.
28 Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855
(1966); Ritter v. Coca-Cola Co., 24 Wis. 2d 157, 128 N.W.2d 439 (1964).
" Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Morris, 273 Ala. 218, 136 So. 2d 883 (1961).
'Moore v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 282 A.2d 625 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
1979]
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ment test, the plaintiff must then persuade the fact finder that the
product was unreasonably dangerous due to the defect.
The concept of "unreasonably dangerous" has been variously
defined by the courts.81 In Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,' the
Oregon Supreme Court stated: "A 'dangerously' defective article
would be one which a reasonable person would not put into the
stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful character.
The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he
sold the article knowing of the risk involved."3
Thus, by reference back to the more familiar, if equally difficult
to apply, negligence standard, the fact finder is expected to impute
the knowledge of the defective condition of the product to the
manufacturer. In essence, then, the Kimwood test shifts the focus
of the reasonableness feature of the negligence standard from the
conduct of the manufacturer to the condition of the product in
order to provide the framework within which the fact finder is to
apply this "reasonableness" aspect of the test.'
The requirement that the product be "unreasonably dangerous"
has also been stated in the disjunctive. With this phrasing, a product
may be "unreasonably" dangerous under the Kimwood test, or if
the product fails to meet the "reasonable" expectations of the
ordinary consumer as to safety. ' Thus, the Restatement's consumer
Although frequently phrased differently, these definitions represent the
courts' attempt to apply comment i to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5
402A definition that to be unreasonably dangerous the "article sold must be dan-
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics," and therefore are each the functional equivalent
of a determination of reasonableness of expectation. See, e.g., Moomey v. Massey-
Ferguson, 429 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1970); Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc., 170
Conn. 18, 364 A.2d 175 (1975); Kleve v. General Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d
568 (Iowa 1973); Vinor v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.,
69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
"269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
33 269 Or. at 494, 525 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis added).
" The court in Kimwood advocated the use of Professor Wade's seven criteria,
discussed in text accompanying note 75 infra, in order to determine whether the
trial judge should submit the issue of reasonableness to the jury. The criteria were
not intended to serve as the basis for the instructions to the jury. 269 Or. at 501,
525 P.2d at 1040.
"See Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973);
Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1974). But see Turner
v. General Motors Corp., 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 272, 273 (No. B-7747 March 24,
1979) which expressly overruled Henderson for conscious design choice cases.
See note 88 infra.
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oriented view of unreasonable danger is expressly made an alter-
nate definition of the standard by which the product is to be
measured.'
The standard for strict liability by which a mismanufactured
product is measured, then, requires employing a dual test for de-
termining whether a mismanufactured product is "defective." First,
the plaintiff must establish that the product does not meet the
standards which the manufacturer itself set for this line of products.
That is, that the product is defective. Second, the plaintiff must
establish that the product is "unreasonably dangerous" as a result
of this defect. The requirement that the product be proven defec-
tive is relatively easily satisfied. The requirement that the product
be proven "unreasonably dangerous" due to mismanufacture is
also susceptible to the application of a standard with which the
courts are comfortable, that is, "the reasonable expectation of the
consumer" or the negligence standard-with an imputed knowledge
component-a different form of "reasonableness"' test." This is true
to such a degree that the concept of strict liability for mismanu-
facture has been equated with a revised definition of negligence
per se by some jurisdictions. 8
I See footnote 31 supra.
"Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 493 n.17, 525 P.2d 1033,
1041 n.17 (1974).
"
8See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976);
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). See
also Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), in which the Wis-
consin Supreme Court stated:
Strict liability in tort for the sale of a defective product unreason-
ably dangerous to an intended user or consumer now arises in this
state by virtue of a decision of this court. If this same liability were
imposed for violation of a statute it is difficult to perceive why we
would not consider it negligence per se for the purpose of applying
the comparative negligence statute just as we have done so many
times in other cases involving the so-called "safety statutes." Under
the definition of negligence per se set forth in Osborne, [Osborne
v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 240, 234 N.W. 372, 378 (1931)]
a safety rule can trace its origin to a court decision as well as a
statute. The violation of a safety statute can create a condition that
constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Likewise, a
defective product can constitute or create an unreasonable risk of
harm to others.
155 N.W.2d at 64. This was effected in part to permit the court to apply the
modified comparative negligence statute in effect in Wisconsin as a partial defense
to the strict liability action.
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In Atkins v. American Motors Corp."9 the Alabama Supreme
Court rejected the Restatement's "no-fault" concept of liability, but
nevertheless went on to adopt a system of liability for manufacturers
who manufacture and sell a "defective product which, because of
its unreasonably unsafe condition, injured the plaintiff or damaged
his property when such product, substantially unaltered, was put
to its intended use."" The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that
selling such a product was "negligence within itself" and that the
fault of the manufacturer lies not in acting unreasonably in plac-
ing on the market a product which causes harm but in creating an
unreasonable risk of harm.
The first serious inroad into the hegemony enjoyed by the Re-
statement's definition of the strict liability cause of action occurred
when the "negligence" element of the Restatement's definition was
questioned. The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement as an ele-
ment of the cause of action for strict liability came under success-
ful attack in Cronin v. J.E.B. Olson Corp."' In Cronin, a manufac-
turing defect case, ' the California Supreme Court rejected the
requirement that a plaintiff must establish that the product was
unreasonably dangerous as well as defective. The court held instead
that all the plaintiff need prove is that the product was in a defective
condition and that the defect was a proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries.'
While the court accepted the proposition that a manufacturer is
not an insurer against all injuries suffered while using its products,
"335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976).
40ld. at 139.
41 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). See also Butaud
v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alas. 1975); Berke-
bile v. Branly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975); Glass v.
Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973). Cf. Center Chemical
Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975) (interpreting Georgia sta-
tute).
4The manufacturer had produced a bread truck whose trays were "defective"
since the metal used was exceedingly porous, containing holes, pits, and voids,
therefore lacking the tensile strength to withstand the forces exerted upon it. 8
Cal. 3d at 124, 501 P.2d at 1156, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
4'8 Cal. 3d at 134, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. In so doing, the
court justified its deviation from the Restatement's standard for liability by stating
that to require that the plaintiff prove both "defect" and "unreasonable danger"
rang of negligence, an element which adoption of strict liability was intended to
eliminate from the plaintiff's cause of action.
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it held that the manufacturer should be liable for those injuries
caused by provable defects in their products regardless of the
"reasonableness" of the manufacturer or the "reasonableness" of
the safety of the product. Since the manufacturer's own standards
for the product could be utilized to define the limits by which a
product was considered non-defective, the fact finder's determina-
tion regarding proximate causation provided the only acceptable
limit of liability as a social policy determination. In eliminating
the unreasonably dangerous requirement, the California court was
in essence adopting a per se test of its own. That is, that if the
plaintiff establishes that the product was defective-that it fell
below the manufacturer's own standards for safety-it was per se
unreasonably dangerous, since any product which fell below the
manufacturer's own standard must necessarily fall below society's
standard as well.
The drafters of the Restatement contemplated that the view-
point of the ordinary consumer with ordinary knowledge would
be employed to determine whether a product's defect rendered it
unreasonably dangerous." This "reasonableness" test for determin-
ing liability for product defect, which, as the court in Cronin
stated, "rings of negligence," was in fact substituted by one court
for the "defect" test adopted by the Cronin court. In Chappuis v.
Sears Roebuck & Co.," the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected
the requirement that the plaintiff prove that a product was both
defective and unreasonably dangerous in order for the manufac-
turer to be held strictly liable. To recover under the Louisiana
"consumer viewpoint single factor" test, all the plaintiff need estab-
lish is that the product is "unreasonably dangerous in normal use." 6
That is, there is no need to establish separately that the product
did not meet a standard set by the manufacturer and then to estab-
"As the Court in Cronin stated:
Dean Prosser, the reporter for the Restatement, suggests that the
"unreasonably dangerous" qualification was added to foreclose the
possibility that the manufacturer of a product with inherent possi-
bilities for harm (for example, butter, drugs, whiskey, and automo-
biles) would become "automatically responsible for all the harm
that such things do in the world."
8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441. See note 31 supra.
4358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978). See also Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86
Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
4358 So. 2d at 929.
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lish as well that the product failed to meet society's standard by
being unreasonably dangerous.
There is, of course, little practical effect in requiring a separate
finding of "defect" if the product must be found to have been
"unreasonably dangerous" under the articulated tests. The Chap-
puis test, therefore, offers an opportunity to focus upon that fea-
ture of the strict liability doctrine which is most familiar and yet
most difficult to apply: the reasonableness standard as the basis
for tort liability. Thus considered, strict liability for manufacturing
defects may be thought of as the logical progeny of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.' While MacPherson eliminated the need to
establish privity between plaintiff and defendant in order for the
plaintiff to bring suit against a defendant for negligence in manu-
facturing, liability was not to be imposed until the plaintiff estab-
lished that the defendant was negligent. The doctrine of strict lia-
bility for manufacturing defects eliminated the requirement that
the defendant "knew or should have known" of the defect in the
product in the exercise of reasonable care, but the defendant's
liability is not established until the plaintiff proved the product
fell below the established standard. This in its various forms re-
quired proof of mismanufacture, unreasonable danger, or, most
commonly, both.
The doctrines of negligence and strict liability for mismanu-
factured products both permit civil liability to be assessed against
a defendant for "conduct" which causes injury to the plaintiff. The
negligence test requires that the plaintiff establish that the de-
fendant failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent or discover
a risk; in strict liability the conduct consists of releasing into the
stream of commerce mismanufactured products which fall below
the standard of care. In a negligence action which involves a prod-
uct, the focus of attention is upon the defendant's conduct to de-
termine if he has acted unreasonably in failing to control a risk
present in the product; in strict liability, the focus is upon the
product to determine whether it represented an unreasonable risk
of injury at the time the defendant released the product into the
stream of commerce. But while liability for mismanufactured
products presents rather clear choices, a manufacturer may also be
47217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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liable for design choices apparently involving more complex and
difficult to apply standards.
B. Design Choice and "Defect"
A manufacturer may, of course, be liable in negligence for fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care in the choice of a design."8 The
standard of care is that of the reasonably prudent manufacturer at
the time of manufacture of the negligently designed product."' As
with liability for manufacture, negligence liability in design cases
is not supplanted by the doctrine of strict liability, but rather, the
plaintiff's available theories of recovery are supplemented.
Allegations of design defect in strict liability can be divided into
two general categories. In the first, the inadvertent design error,
the manufacturer's choice of a particular design does not accom-
plish that which the product engineer would have anticipated the
design choice to have accomplished if he had given consideration
to the issue." An inadvertent design error is similar in many re-
'spects to a manufacturing flaw. Presumably, if the manufacturer
48 See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1970); McKinney v. Frodsham, 57 Wash. 2d 126, 356 P.2d 100
(1960). For an interesting discussion of negligence liability for design under
Italian law, see Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 470, 485-88
(N.D. Ill. 1971).
"I It is important to note that the criteria most often applied in evaluating
whether the manufacturer has been negligent in designing a product which has
been in use for a period of time include: (1) the customary design practices of
other manufacturers at the time of manufacture; (2) the open and obvious nature
of the danger presented by the design; and (3) the extent of the claimant's use of
the product alleged to have caused the injury and the period of time involved in
such use by the claimant and others prior to the injury without harmful incident.
Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1182 (5th Cir. 1971). If, of course, the
manufacturer becomes aware that a design choice (or a non-negligent manufac-
turing defect) represents a risk of injury, the manufacturer may have an affirma-
tive duty to warn earlier purchasers of that product. See Comstock v. General
Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959). See also Annot., Products
Liability: Admissibility, Against Manufacturer, of Product Recall Letter, 84
A.L.R.3d 1220 (1978).
1* Professor Henderson has described this standard for evaluating "defect" to
include:
[R]isks of harm which originate in the inadvertent failure of the
design engineer to appreciate adequately the implications of the
various elements of his design, or to employ commonly understood
and universally accepted engineering techniques to achieve the ends
intended with regard to the product.
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1548 (1973).
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were aware of the manufacturing flaw, or the inadvertent design
error, he would not market the product." Similarly, the standard
for determining whether an inadvertent design error causes the
product to represent an "unreasonable danger" can be similar to
that for a manufacturing flaw, that is, whether the reasonable
manufacturer would not have marketed the product had he been
aware of the effects of his inadvertent design choice prior to
marketing the product.
The imputed knowledge test, then, works equally well in the
inadvertent design defect case as in the case of a manufactur-
ing flaw. For example, a propeller, which due to an inadvertent
design choice has a tendency to "overspeed" and therefore pre-
sents a risk of injury," is conceptually as defective as if the metal
alloy from which the propeller was cast contained some unin-
tended and undiscovered contaminant. Both types of defect are
hidden from the manufacturer as well as the consumer, and there-
fore neither is susceptible to any meaningful warning by the
manufacturer to reduce the risk of injury."'
A subcategory of the inadvertent design defect is equally sus-
ceptible to a relatively simple analysis. This subcategory involves
either a design choice which is not essential to the intended use
of the product, or involves a relatively uncomplicated product in
which the question of risk can be analyzed relatively easily. The
fact finder can conclude whether the product falls below the estab-
lished standard by consideration of the dangerous nature of the
design itself or of a safer design alternative. Thus, the addition to
"This is just another way of saying that the "imputed knowledge" test for
defining the standard of care for strict liability for product defects would be an
effective vehicle for setting the parameters of liability, since both could rely upon
a familiar test for establishing liability, that is, what the "reasonable person"
would do.
52See Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964).
53 While strict liability for failure to warn of risks inherent in the design of
a product has been imposed, this "defect" in marketing of the product has usually
been the basis for a cause of action only when the manufacturer was aware of
the risks inherent in the chosen design. See, e.g., Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co.,
532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976); Woodhill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349,
374 N.E.2d 683 (1978). Compare strict liability for failure to warn with strict
liability for non-negligent misrepresentation under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, 5 402B (1965), where knowledge of the foreseeability of the risks created
by the product is an unnecessary element of the cause of action if the seller has
made a misrepresentation of fact. Crocker v. Winthrop Lab. Div. of Sterling
Drug, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
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an automobile's hubcaps of purely ornamental blades which cause
injury to the passenger of a motorcycle which is involved in a
collision with the automobile is not the type of design choice which
a jury is incapable of finding defective when compared to hubcaps
of a safer design." Nor would the decision not to include crash-
worthy safety harnesses or crashworthy seat belt brackets on a
light aircraft in the light of evidence that they are feasible and
relatively inexpensive constitute the type of design choice that the
jury is incapable of analyzing.' In this subcategory also, it can
be argued that if the manufacturer were aware of the risks of
injury involved in the design choice, this choice would not have
been made.
The second category of design defects, however, involves the
conscious design choice which is directly related to the function
of the product. In making this choice the design engineers are
aware that there are risks of injury associated with the intended
design, but determine that these risks are outweighed by the in-
creased benefits or reduced costs which the engineers or designers
believe justify the conscious acceptance of those risks in the final
product."8
It can be argued that liability for manufacturing flaws or in-
advertent design choices penalizes an ineffectual attempt by the
manufacturer to achieve a desired goal. Such cases are therefore
merely steps on the fault continuum, representing a slightly modi-
fied standard of proof to establish the breach of a traditionally
accepted standard of care. Strict liability for conscious design
choices, however, represents a very distinct step much further along
that same continuum. Strict liability for manufacturing flaws repre-
4See Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
5 See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, reh. denied
with opinion, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978).
"See cases cited in Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d
816, 827 (1978). Thus, in one of the classic illustrations of this type of design
choice calculus, although the allegation was negligence, the manufacturers of an
inexpensive microbus were found not liable for designing their vehicle to provide
maximum cargo space, passenger space, and maneuverability by placing the driv-
er's seat in close proximity to the front of the vehicle. This design choice consider-
ably reduced the "crash barrier" space between the driver's compartment and
the actual front of the vehicle. In the absence of any evidence that the crash-
worthiness of the vehicle could have been enhanced consistently with the peculiar
purpose of the design, the plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action. Dreison-
stok v. Volkswagenwerk, 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
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sents liability for deviation from the manufacturer's own standard.
Strict liability for inadvertent design choice also represents liability
for deviation from the manufacturer's own standards, for we can
assume that had the risks of the inadvertent design choice been
made clear to the manufacturer a different design would have been
chosen or a warning provided." Strict liability for conscious de-
sign choice, however, represents a social choice substituted for
the decision of the design engineers. By hypothesis-that the de-
signers were not negligent-the conduct of the engineers in eval-
uating and weighing the risks and benefits was "reasonable"; yet,
the jury is permitted to impose liability if it determines that the
product of such reasonable conduct was an "unreasonable" design.
Thus, while a determination of defect in a manufacturing defect
case has been susceptible to relatively easy evaluation by objective
comparison of the "defective" product to the manufacturer's in-
tended result, a different conceptual problem has arisen from the
creation of strict liability for the conscious design choices of manu-
facturers.
The problem arises, not from the process through which lia-
bility is imposed, but rather from the standards by which a manu-
facturer's conscious design choice is found to be defective and,
therefore, the object for which strict liability is imposed." It seems
paradoxical to hold that a manufacturer's product is "defective"
although it performs as the manufacturer intended and even though
the risks which culminated in injury to the plaintiff were of a cate-
gory considered by the manufacturer and accepted as risks against
which the product was not designed to protect. Yet this is an in-
evitable result of holding that the negligence standard is not an
acceptable minimum standard by which to measure the manu-
facturer's liability for conscious design choices.5' In this category
of strict liability, imputed knowledge has no impact at all upon a
57 See footnote 51 supra.
51 Professor Henderson has argued that the adjudicative process is not ap-
propriately designed to handle the difficult process of evaluating conscious design
choices in order to develop or apply a standard for liability for injuries which are
suffered as a result of those "choices." Henderson, supra note 50, at 1531.
"Not surprisingly, associations representing manufacturers or the defense bar
have strenuously advocated the negligence standard as the minimum standard
of care for liability in conscious design choice cases. E.g., THE DEFENSE RESEARCH
INST., INC., PRODUCTS LIABILITY POSITION PAPER 12 (1976); TEX. ASS'N OF DE-
FENSE COUNSEL, PRODUCTS LIABILITY POSITION PAPER 7 (1978).
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manufacturer's liability, for presumably the manufacturer is aware
of the risks created by the design choice and yet, although cogni-
zant of those risks, is not negligent in selling, marketing or manu-
facturing the product in that condition." Resort to a standard of
what the ordinary consumer expects of the product as to safety in
intended or foreseeable use has not solved the difficulties of apply-
ing a standard for this type of defect.'
Some of the difficulties encountered in this type of case were dis-
cussed by the Oregon Supreme Court in Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp." Wilson involved the consolidated trial and appeal of two
wrongful death actions brought by the personal representatives of
two passengers who died as a result of the crash of a small airplane
manufactured by the defendant. The four-passenger airplane which
was the subject of the litigation was manufactured in 1966. In
1971, shortly after take-off from the Eugene, Oregon airport, it
crashed into the mountains right after entering a cloud. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the crash was caused by engine failure due to
carburetor icing" and also that certain defects regarding the crash-
worthiness of the rear passenger compartment caused or con-
tributed to the injuries." Although the aircraft met the applicable
standards approved by the FAA and had been issued a certificate
6 While a manufacturer may be liable for failing to warn of risks inherent in
a conscious design choice case where the manufacturer would not be liable for
the design choice, this aspect of strict liability for products is outside the intended
scope of this article. See, e.g., Patterson, Products Liability: The Manufacturer's
Continuing Duty to Improve His Products or Warn of Defects After Sale, 62 ILL.
B.J. 92 (1973).
61 Thus, the standard of what the ordinary consumer expects as to safety leaves
unanswered the question of what factors the fact finder may consider in determin-
ing the expectations of this fictitious "ordinary reasonable consumer." See Bruce
v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976), noted, 43 J. AIR L.
& COM. 587 (1977).
62282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, reh. denied with opinion, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d
1287 (1978).
6577 P.2d at 1324.
64Id. at 1328. Plaintiffs also alleged that the aircraft was not equipped with
crashworthy seat belt brackets and shoulder belt harnesses. This type of "defect"
would, of course, represent an inadvertent design choice if the plaintiffs were suc-
cessful in establishing this element of their cause of action, since these features
would not significantly affect the over-all engineering of the aircraft, nor would
they be unduly expensive. 577 P.2d at 1327. Thus, a design engineer would be ex-
pected to choose a more effective available safety harness and seat belt bracket if
he were aware of the risks which his inadvertent design choice created. See text
accompanying note 55 supra.
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of airworthiness, the Oregon court, following the trend of other
jurisdictions,' held that these standards were minimum standards
only. 6
The Oregon Supreme Court in Wilson, however, was faced with
the problem of establishing a standard by which the risks created
by the product could be measured. In Phillips v. Kimwood Ma-
chinery Co.,6" the court earlier had stated that a product is defec-
tive if "a reasonably prudent manufacturer would not have so
designed and sold the article in question had he known of the
risk involved which injured plaintiff."' This definition of defect,
as we have seen, permits the fact finder to evaluate manufacturing
" See, e.g., Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 64 I11. App. 3d 770, 381 N.E.2d
715 (1978). But see Banko v. Continental Motors Corp., 373 F.2d 314 (4th Cir.
1966); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal.
1975). It appears that one jurisdiction may have rejected that trend and struck
out on its own. In 1977, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Temple v. Wean United
Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977), in which a punch press operator
was injured when extrusion material fell off of the press and onto the dual operat-
ing buttons causing the 75 ton power punch press to close down on her arm re-
sulting in the eventual amputation of both arms just below the elbow.
The plaintiff sued the manufacturer among others, alleging that the press was
defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous because the manufacturers failed
to provide a fixed barrier guard which would have prevented the plaintiff from
inserting her arms into the danger zone of the press. The lower court granted
summary judgment.
In resolving the issue of a conscious design defect, the Ohio court stated that
a manufacturer has a duty to use "reasonable care under the circumstances to so
design his product as to make it not accident or foolproof, but safe for the use
for which it was intended." 50 Ohio St. 2d at 326, 364 N.E.2d at 273. Therefore,
the court held that it would look to statutory regulations for those objective
design standards which could be utilized in evaluating whether the design under
consideration was unreasonably dangerous.
The Ohio Industrial Commission Safety Code guidelines approved the two
hand tripping device which the plaintiffs contended was the reasonably safe design
choice as well as the two hand tripping safety device which the defendant had
incorporated into its product. As a result of compliance with the governmentally
acceptable method of providing for a safety device, as a matter of law, the de-
fendant was not negligent in making this design choice.
The impact of this decision has persuaded one pair of commentators to an-
nounce that "compliance with [governmentally established or recognized stand-
ards] is conclusive of the issue of product design reasonableness and entitles the
manufacturer to judgment as a matter of law." Strause & Hedden, Liability for
Product Design in Ohio-A First Step Toward Solution, 11 AKRON L. REV. 663,
676 (1978). See also Wade, On The Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44
MIss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
61 577 P.2d at 1324-25.
6269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
68 269 Or. at 494, 525 P.2d at 1037.
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flaw and inadvertent design defect cases, in which the imputation
of knowledge of the defect to the manufacturer could be followed
by a reasonableness test to effectively set the standard for establish-
ing liability for the mismanufactured product."" Wilson, however,
dealt with a conscious design choice: the manufacturer in Wilson
did know of the risk involved in selling the product in the condi-
tion in which the consumer received it. To apply the Kimwood
"imputed knowledge" definition would be redundant and effec-
tively require proof of negligence.
The significance of imputing knowledge of the defect to the
manufacturer in inadvertent design and manufacturing flaw cases
is apparent. If, as in Cronin, the manufacturer is to be held abso-
lutely liable for injuries proximately caused when a manufacturing
flaw has occurred, then potentially the manufacturer's liability will
flow from a breach of its own standard without reference to any
societal standard of care. The tacit assumption underlying this
approach is that society's standard will always be at least as high
as that which the manufacturer has set for itself. Contrast this to
the court's opinion in Kimwood, where it is suggested how a manu-
facturer might market a product defective but yet not unreason-
ably dangerous:
To some it may seem that absolute liability has been imposed
upon the manufacturer since it might be argued that no manufac-
turer could reasonably put into the stream of commerce an article
which he realized might result in injury to a user. This is not the
case, however. The manner of injury may be so fortuitous and
the chances of injury occurring so remote that it is reasonable to
sell the product despite the danger. In design cases the utility of
the article may be so great, and the change of design necessary to
alleviate the danger in question may so impair such utility, that it
is reasonable to market the product as it is, even though the possi-
bility of injury exists and was realized at the time of the sale. Again,
the cost of the change necessary to alleviate the danger in design
may be so great that the article would be priced out of the market
and no one would buy it even though it was of high utility. Such
an article is not dangerously defective despite its having inflicted
injury. 0
Recognizing that the evidence of defective design as the court
" See text accompanying note 34 supra.
70 269 Or. at 495-96, 525 P.2d at 1038.
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
articulated it in Kimwood was similar to the evidence of negli-
gence,' the Wilson court articulated different standards by which
an allegation of conscious design choice defect would be evaluated.
The primary element in an allegation of defect due to conscious
design choice under the Wilson standard is the requirement that
the plaintiffs establish that an alternative to the design selected
by the defendant is more than just a technical possibility." In
Wilson, the plaintiffs were alleging that the carburetor design
chosen by the defendant was defective in one particular: the
carburetor was subject to icing which could result in engine fail-
ure. Except for the icing characteristic, the carburetor design
chosen was a highly successful, dependable choice, similar to that
used in eighty to ninety percent of all comparable airplanes.
When a jury is instructed that in order to find liability they
must first find that the product contains a "defect," it must be
recognized that the existence vel non of the term "defect" implies
in common parlance that there is a standard from which the manu-
facturer has deviated. In the absence of an already available stand-
ard for the conscious design choice, many of the courts have
" As the court stated, "[w]e are ... committed to the position that members
of the public are entitled to compensation for their injuries if they are damaged
because of improper product design. Actions for negligence would pose the iden-
tical difficulty because the evidence is similar." 577 P.2d at 1326.
"The court went on to state, however, that this would not be a requirement
in all product cases. It acknowledged that a product of limited utility represent-
ing a severe danger might subject the manufacturer to liability since the "reason-
able" manufacturer would not commit such an act. That is, the standard for fault
based liability would not require an alternative design before submission. 577
P.2d at 1328 n.5. The reasonable alternative test has been accepted by other
courts, however, as a basis by which to measure whether the manufacturer's de-
sign choice should subject the manufacturer to liability. See, e.g., Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976); Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741,
744 (7th Cir. 1974). As the court in Wilson stated:
One of the factors to be weighed in making this determination is
the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive
to maintain its utility. In other words, the court is to determine,
and to weigh in the balance, whether the proposed alternative
design has been shown to be practicable. The trial court should not
permit an allegation of design defect to go to the jury unless there
is sufficient evidence upon which to make this determination. If
liability for alleged design defects is to "stop somewhere short of
the freakish and the fantastic," plaintiffs' prima facie case of a de-
fect must show more than the technical possibility of a safer design.
577 P.2d at 1326 (footnote omitted).
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adopted, a risk-utility balancing test."3 The jury is expected to
weigh these factors and make judgments regarding the social de-
sirability of the conscious design choice trade-off.' The Wilson
court recognized, however, that the alternative design test adopted
by them would require an initial determination whether to submit
the case to the jury even when the plaintiff did present an alterna-
tive to the chosen design.
The factors which may be considered in this pre-jury submission
test to determine whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous"
due to a conscious design choice have been variously phrased.
Perhaps the most widely cited and those accepted by the Wilson
court are those listed by Dean Wade." Dean Wade's seven criteria
included:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility
to the user and to the public as a whole;
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it
will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury;
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be unsafe;
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility;
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care
in the use of the product;
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability because of general public
knowledge or the obvious conditions of the product, or of the
existence of suitable warnings or instructions;
(7) The feasibility on the part of the manufacturer of spreading
7 See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Machinery Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa
1978), in which the court stated:
In order to prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous, the
injured plaintiff must prove the product is dangerous and that it was
unreasonable for such a danger to exist. Proof of unreasonableness
involves a balancing process. On one side of the scale is the utility
of the product and on the other is the risk of its use.
268 N.W.2d at 835.
' This is, of course, what the jury is expected to be able to accomplish when
the allegation is that the manufacturer was negligent as well. That is, by balancing
many of these same factors, the jury is expected to be able to determine whether
a manufacturer has acted "reasonably."
" Wade, supra note 65.
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the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance."6
Since the plaintiffs in Wilson could not establish that the design
"I d. at 837-38. Professor Fischer has organized the factors to be weighed in
the following outline:
I. Risk Spreading
A. From the point of view of the consumer
1. Ability of consumer to bear loss
2. Feasibility, and effectiveness of self-protective measures.
a. Knowledge of risk
b. Ability to control danger
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product.
B. From the point of view of the manufacturer
I. Knowledge of risk
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses
3. Size of losses
4. Availability of insurance
5. Ability of manufacturer to self insure
6. Effect of increased prices on industry.
7. Public necessity for the product
8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products.
II. Safety Incentive
A. Likelihood of future product improvements.
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be
taken.
C. Availability of safer substitutes.
Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo.L. REV. 339, 359
(1974).
Stated very generally, the conclusion is that the manufacturer of the product
is best capable of making a cost-benefit analysis, and therefore, when the manu-
facturer's "analysis" (whether performed or not) is not accepted, liability should
follow. In arguing for a system of strict liability, Calabresi & Hirschoff seem to
assume this to be the case even though the manufacturer cannot make the prod-
uct any safer for users who are in a better position than the manufacturer to
evaluate the risks created by the product. Since the manufacturer can make the
decision to market the product and risk current damages or invest in further re-
search, they contend, manufacturers should bear the burden of financial liability.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1071 (1972). The contrast of this analysis to traditional fault analysis is
apparent, for strict liability is imposed even though the manufacturer was un-
aware that the product presented any risks of injury at the time of sale. The de-
cision to market the product at the time, as opposed to continued research which,
despite its extent, might still result in a manufacturer being found liable, is the
act for which strict liability will be imposed. Phipps v. General Motors Corp.,
278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co.,
42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969). This would be true even though the
manufacturer performed more safety research than the "reasonable" manufacturer
if his product were "unsafe." Compare Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978), where the California
Supreme Court held that reasonable precautions taken by a manufacturer in an
attempt to design a safe product will not preclude imposition of strict liability if
the product's design is unsafe to consumers, users, or bystanders.
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alternatives to carburetion available to the manufacturer would
have reduced the risk of icing without increasing other risks of
injury," the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case that
the choice of carburetion rendered the plane defective."8
In the application of strict liability to the typical conscious de-
sign choice case, no manufacturing defect exists, and the design
choice at issue is not inadvertent. The primary problem then, is
establishing a satisfactory standard or set of criteria below which
the conscious design choice can be found to have fallen. This
standard for strict liability should be capable of being applied by
a jury and not redundant of the negligence standard. If the fore-
seeable risks are such that a reasonable manufacturer would not
have marketed the product in its present state, then the manu-
facturer may be found to have been negligent.
However, strict liability has been imposed even in those situa-
tions where the manufacturer was aware of all risks and was not
negligent in marketing the product. Defining the standard by
which the manufacturer would be held liable in strict liability for
"The seven Wade criteria were adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Kinwood as the appropriate standard by which the trial court should determine
whether the issue of the manufacturer's liability for injuries should be submitted
to the jury, 269 Or. 457, 501, 525 P.2d 1033, 1040 (1974). Justice Linde, con-
curring in Wilson, suggested that many of these criteria were similar to those
which were considered by the FAA prior to granting a certificate of airworthi-
ness. He therefore concluded that when a product is subject not only to pre-
scribed performance standards but to government supervised testing and specific
approval or disapproval on safety grounds, no further balance whether a product
design is "unreasonably dangerous" for its intended use need be struck by a court
or jury unless (1) the standards of safety or utility are less demanding than those
set for civil liability for product design, or (2) the regulatory agency did not ad-
dress the alleged defective element of the design or fell short of its assigned task.
577 P.2d at 1334-35. See also note 65 supra.
Thus, while such acts as the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
2051-2081 (1976), expressly provide that a manufacturer's compliance with the
provisions of the Act will not relieve the manufacturer from civil liability at com-
mon law (or under state statutory law) for product safety, a court having adopted
strict liability could also adopt any pertinent Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion regulation as the standard for "defect" in design. See 15 U.S.C. § 2075
(1976). See generally Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR
L. & COM. 1 (1978).
78 In Wilson, although the plaintiffs introduced evidence of an available fuel
injection system, they failed to establish "what effect the substitution of a fuel in-
jected engine in this airplane design would have had upon the airplane's cost,
economy of operation, maintenance requirements, overall performance, or safety
in respects other than susceptibility to icing." 577 P.2d at 1327. The plaintiffs also
alleged other defects in design. See also note 64 supra.
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a conscious design choice had been, as noted in Wilson, an inte-
grated concept; that is, a conscious design choice did not make a
product defective unless the product was unreasonably dangerous
as a result of the conscious design choice." The gravamen of strict
" The determination of whether the product is "unreasonably dangerous,"
once the threshhold determination to submit the issue to the jury is made, is one
which has presented ample room for judicial creation. That the issue so carefully
corresponds to the same balancing factors present in the determination of negli-
gence, however, reflects the fault based foundations of the theory of strict liability.
Thus, in Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
the jury was instructed that under Pennsylvania law unreasonably dangerous was
explained in an automobile design case as follows:
In determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous and
therefore defective because of its design, there are a number of fac-
tors which you should consider. As you will see, when I have listed
all these factors, you may have to balance them against each other,
sort of like in a formula. In other words, some may cut one way
and some the other. No one factor by itself will be all-important.
First, you should consider the likelihood that the product as thus de-
signed will result in injury to a user. Applied to the present "crash-
worthiness" case, you should consider the likelihood that the '66
Toronado, as it was designed, would, in an accident situation,
cause (or fail to protect an occupant from) injury. In this regard,
you must in turn also consider the likelihood that a '66 Toronado
would be struck in the rear on a highway: (1) at a closure speed
such as you in fact find to have been present in this case; and (2)
in the manner in which you find the collision to have occurred in
this case. If you find that an accident of this kind was not unlikely
to occur, that would be a factor to consider in the balancing
formula on unreasonableness of danger. If you so find; you should
also consider the likelihood that a Toronado designed in the manner
of the '66 model would, in circumstances such as you find occurred,
experience a fire resulting from ignition of the fuel system's gaso-
line vapors which would invade the passenger compartment. If you
find such a likelihood of injury, you should consider that factor in
deciding whether the automobile here was unreasonably dangerous.
The second factor you should consider in the unreasonably danger-
ous formula is the seriousness of potential injury in such circum-
stances.
Third, you should consider the ability of the manufacturer, GM,
to eliminate any unsafe characteristics which you find in the car,
without impairing the usefulness of the car or significantly increasing
its cost.
Fourth, you should consider whether the Toronado was dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated or expected
by the ordinary user, considering the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to the automobile's characteristics. In this re-
gard, you should consider the question of warnings, for I instruct
you that a product can be rendered defective by reason of failure
to give warnings as to risks or dangers in the product. As I have
previously stated, the degree of warning depends upon the degree
of danger since a greater degree of danger requires a greater degree
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of warning. However, you should also consider the ability of the
manufacturer to notify or warn the user of the danger in a given
situation, and the degree to which warning was meaningful.
In applying those factors to the formula you may find that some
cut one way-toward unreasonable danger-and some the other-
away from that conclusion. It is for you, the jury, to evaluate them
in light of the facts as you find them in the case, and to determine
where the correct balance lies. You may of course find there to be
other factors which appear from the evidence to shed light on
whether the Toronado's design was defective, and if so you may
consider them.
To recapitulate: I have told you that Mr. Bowman's second claim in
this case-wholly distinct from his claim of negligence-is based on
the doctrine of Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Products.
I have defined 'defect' in terms of 'unreasonableness of the danger,'
because I believe that to have assigned you the task of determining
whether there was a 'defect' without such guidance would have been
too difficult. However, I believe that it may also be helpful to give
you a general definition of defect which you may also apply in
your deliberation. In terms pertinent here, Webster defines 'defect'
to mean 'an absence of something necessary to adequacy of func-
tion.' Applied to this case, the question would be: Did the design
of the Toronado lack something necessary for adequate perform-
ance of its function-namely, to provide a reasonably safe com-
partment for transportation of occupants of motor vehicles; that
is, one designed not to be crashproof or to provide absolute safety
against all risks of the road, but to provide reasonable safety against
the foreseeable risks of the road.
427 F. Supp. at 243-44 (footnote omitted). The similarity of this test to the seven
elements which Dean Wade listed is more than coincidence for the judge relied
upon those criteria in drafting the instruction. Id. at 244. The court distinguished
the test for liability under its instruction from that for liability under negligence
by stating that a manufacturer might make a "reasonable" decision to adopt a
given design which has a slightly lower price, thus providing consumers with
the option to purchase the cheaper but less safe product. Nevertheless, in a strict
liability lawsuit, the court stated, the injured party should be permitted to have
the issue of liability submitted to the jury under the risk balancing test just
articulated. 427 F. Supp. at 245. See text accompanying note 99 infra.
The risk/utility test has been followed by other courts as well. See, e.g.,
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978) (and
cases cited therein).
Although much has been made of the analysis necessary to determine
whether a conscious design defect is unreasonably dangerous, at least one court
has failed to see what all of the confusion is about:
As we see it, divorced from the glut of erudition erupting from the
scholars, a theory of strict liability for manufacturers of mechani-
cal products ought to be rather simple. The product either is or
is not unreasonably dangerous to a person who should be expected
to use or be exposed to it. If it is, it can make no difference
whether it is dangerous by design or by accident. As aptly observed
in 62 Ky. L.J. 866, 875, "the important factor is how safe or dan-
gerous the product is when used as it was intended to be used" [or
should reasonably have been anticipated to be used]. If the danger is
unreasonable because it is not obvious and may not be appre-
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liability for conscious design choice was the requirement that the
plaintiff prove that the choice rendered the entire product "un-
reasonably dangerous."80 Then came Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co.8
1
While Cronin was a manufacturing defect case in which the
court abandoned the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the
product contained a defect that caused injury and that the defect
made the product unreasonably dangerous, 2 Barker was a case in
hended by such a person, then it may be obviated by an adequate
warning, so provided or affixed that in the ordinary course of events
it will reach and should be understood by that person. Whether
such a warning is so provided is nothing more than one of the
factors determining whether the product is unreasonably dangerous.
Cf. Restatement, Torts 2d S 402A, Comment j.
Though strict liability does not depend upon negligence, a degree
of kinship between the two does inhere in the term "unreasonably
dangerous." Both utilize the concept of reasonable foreseeability.
The difference is that negligence depends on what a prudent manu-
facturer, engaged in a business similar to that of the defendant,
by the exercise of ordinary care actually should have discovered
and foreseen, whereas strict liability depends on what he would
have anticipated had he been (but regardless of whether he actually
was or should have been) aware of the condition of and the
potentialities inhering in the product when he put it on the market.
Where the one is actual, the other is postulated.
Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976).
" Thus, the Supreme Court of Washington simplified the issue of deter-
mining the limits of liability for a conscious design choice by following those
courts which have accepted the proposition that a product is defective if it is
unreasonably dangerous. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145,
542 P.2d 774 (1975). See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973). Cf. Chappuis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 358
So. 2d 926 (La. 1978) (discussed in text accompanying note 45 supra). This test
of unreasonable danger is whether the product is less safe than that reasonably
contemplated by the ordinary consumer taking into account the relative cost
of the product, the gravity of the potential harm, and the cost or feasibility of
eliminating or minimizing the risk created by the product. See also Dickerson,
Product Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301
(1967); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the
Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969); Kessler,
Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887 (1967); Rheingold, What are the Con-
sumer's "Reasonable Expectations"? 22 Bus. LAw. 589 (1967).
81 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
82Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972). The court in Cronin, however, did not limit the parameters
of its decision to the manufacturing defect cases. "We can see no difficulty in
applying the Greenman formulation to the full range of products liability situa-
tions including those involving design defect. A defect may emerge from the mind
of a designer as well as from the hand of a workman." 8 Cal. 3d at 134-35,
501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. At least one court has speculated that
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which the plaintiff alleged that the product was defective due to
conscious design choices made by the manufacturer. In charging
the jury, the trial judge instructed them that the conscious design
choices made by the manufacturer might be considered defects if
they rendered the product unreasonably dangerous.
In reversing the judgment for the defendants, the California
Supreme Court rejected the requirement that the manufacturer's
conscious design choice render the product unreasonably danger-
ous before the manufacturer might be found strictly liable for
conscious design choice. The court did not dispute the defendant's
assertion that, unlike Cronin, in which the plaintiff had a dual
problem of proof, that is, first proving defect, and second that the
defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous, the con-
scious design choice case presents an integrated issue of establishing
that the conscious design choice was a "defect" since it made the
product unreasonably dangerous." The court nonetheless refused
to accept as the standard for defining defect in a conscious design
choice case the requirement that the product be unreasonably
dangerous. In its stead, the court imposed a disjunctive test for
determining whether a product was defective due to a conscious
design choice."
Under the Barker test, the product may be found defective if
the product fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner or if the plaintiff proves that the defendant's product proxi-
mately caused injury and the defendant fails to prove in light of all
the relevant factors that the benefits of the challenged design out-
weighed the risk of danger inherent in the design."'
The first alternative of this two prong test "rings of" the un-
reasonably dangerous requirement adopted by other courts, and
the Cronin court misconstrued the nature of the defect, intending to imply that
the defect described therein was a "design" defect. Thus, the quoted language
would have been applicable to the case being decided and not intended to have
expanded the parameters of the court's decision. See Seattle First Nat'l Bank v.
Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774, 777-78 (1978).
8 20 Cal. 3d at 424, 573 P.2d at 450, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
"Barker represents an attempt by the California Supreme Court to fashion
a workable balancing test to overcome the many criticisms of the Cronin rule
and the ambiguities created therefrom.
120 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-39.
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thus reintroduces "reasonableness"; the second alternative also
rings of the traditional negligence standard adopted by such deci-
sions as Wilson, but with an important difference. While the
California court states that the jury will focus their analysis on
the product and not the adequacy of the manufacturer's conduct,
this seems a difficult if not impossible proposition to maintain in
light of the complexities of the modern production methods which
the court felt compelled it to adopt such a bifurcated standard."S
Equally importantly, the court altered the focus and burden of
proof under this second alternative for proving defect due to
conscious design choice. Under the second alternative, the plaintiff
needs only to make a prima facie showing that the injury was
proximately caused by the product's design for the burden of proof
to shift to the manufacturer."' The manufacturer then must prove
that the product was not defective as a result of the conscious de-
sign choice made by the manufacturer. This burden of proof can
only be met by the manufacturer according to listed elements
on a risk-benefit theory. Among those factors which a jury may
consider in determining whether the risk of the conscious design
choice outweighs its benefits are the gravity of the danger posed
by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would
occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design,
81 This test, moreover, explicitly focuses the trier of fact's attention
on the adequacy of the product itself, rather than on the manu-
facturer's conduct, and places the burden on the manufacturer,
rather than the plaintiff, to establish that because of the complexity
of, and trade-offs implicit in, the design process, an injury-produc-
ing product should nevertheless not be found defective.
20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
1120 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237, followed in
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 463 F. Supp. 94 (D. Nev. 1978).
In Jeppesen the insurer for an airline had settled wrongful death claims and
sued as the subrogee of the airline against the defendant "manufacturer" of the
landing charts used by the pilot. The defendant employed FAA form No. 511
information to compile the data from which the charts were drafted in both a
profile and a plan view. In drafting landing chart L.V. No. 3, the defendant
employed a five to one scale between the profile and plan view whereas the
majority of the 67 charts provided in the aircraft's manual of landing charts
had a profile to plan view scale of about one to one. The question of the pilot's
negligence was res judicata, having been litigated earlier. The federal district
court judge sitting in this diversity action predicted that the Supreme Court of
Nevada would apply Barker to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to
the defendant when the plaintiff established that the product was a proximate
cause of the accident.
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the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse con-
sequences to the product and to the consumer that would result
from an alternative design.88 Thus, unlike the Wilson test, the
Barker test would permit the jury to consider an alternative design
in determining whether the design choice was a defect, but a rea-
sonable alternative is not the sine qua non for such a finding that
it apparently is under the Wilson test.
It is important to note that unlike the negligence standard, these
criteria would be applied by a jury through hindsight, and not by
applying a prospective standard from the point of manufacture,"
although presumably the jury would be expected to make the risk-
benefit analysis by weighing the alternatives available to the manu-
facturer at the time of manufacture." This places on the manu-
facturer the obligation to establish that, "because of the com-
plexity of, and trade-offs implicit in, the design process.'. at the
time of manufacture, an injury-producing design choice should
not be considered a "defect." Thus, in addition to altering the
traditional allocation of the burden of proof, the court has at-
tempted to draw a distinction between application of a balancing
test to determine whether the manufacturer was negligent in adopt-
ing a particular conscious design choice, and application of a
balancing test to determine whether a product was defective. If
1820 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. Compare these
factors with those factors which the jury may consider in determining whether a
product is "unreasonably dangerous." See text accompanying note 31 supra. In-
terestingly, the California court cites the disjunctive test employed by Texas in
support of its decision to approve a jury instruction for a disjunctive test of liabil-
ity. The Texas court abandoned that disjunctive test and, in fact, went so far as
to prohibit instructing the jury of any definition of "unreasonably dangerous" or
of instructing the jury of criteria to consider in a conscious design defect case.
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 22 Tax. Sup. Ct. J. 272 (No. B-7747 March 24,
1979). See note 35 supra.
89 20 Cal. 3d at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. But see Horn v.
General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976).
0 Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970). See O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Terminology,
Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 627 (1978) in which the author points
out that there was expert testimony in Horn that under the technology current at
the time of manufacture of the product, the product defect could have been elimi-
nated. The author also points out that plaintiffs argued to the jury that an alterna-
tive design could have been implemented at an insignificant additional cost. The
author further notes the questionable procedural basis upon which Cunningham
might have been decided. 11 AKRON L. REV. at 639-42.
81 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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the manufacturer took reasonable precautions in an attempt to
design a safe product, or otherwise acted as a reasonable manu-
facturer would under the circumstances, using reasonable fore-
sight, the manufacturer will be absolved of liability for negligence.
However, if with the benefit of hindsight, the trier of fact concludes
that the product was defective by application of the foregoing bal-
ancing test, because the manufacturer cannot bear the burden of
proving otherwise, the manufacturer may be held strictly liable
for a product defect.'"
How far the Barker court actually has departed from the tradi-
tional "reasonableness" standard is difficult to determine. While
its action in shifting the burden of justifying a design choice to
the manufacturer may have important practical consequences, it
does not alter the theoretical basis of liability. And although the
Barker court eschews the term "unreasonably dangerous," it adopts
essentially the same risk-utility balancing method used by the
Wilson court and others to define "unreasonable danger." It is sug-
gested here that Barker in fact retains the standard of "unreason-
able danger," albeit without so naming it.
On a more fundamental level, however, the Barker court may
be correct in refusing to label its standard one of "reasonableness."
When strict liability is imposed for a conscious design choice, the
manufacturer is assessed a loss which stems from conduct that
cannot be called "unreasonable," even after the imputed knowl-
edge device developed in the manufacturing flaw cases has been
applied. The Barker decision thus illustrates sharply a conflict which
the advocates for departure from the negligence standard and the
adoption in its place of a standard of strict liability have never
adequately resolved: whether the primary rationale of strict lia-
92 Rejecting the suggestion of the California Trial Lawyers Association, in their
amicus brief, that weighing the benefits of the design against the risks of danger
inherent in the design is the equivalent of determining whether the manufacturer
was negligent, the court stated:
Thus, the fact that the manufacturer took reasonable precautions
in an attempt to design a safe product or otherwise acted as a rea-
sonably prudent manufacturer would have under the circumstances,
while perhaps absolving the manufacturer of liability under a negli-
gence theory, will not preclude the imposition of liability under
strict liability principles if, upon hindsight, the trier of fact con-
cludes that the product's design is unsafe to consumers, users, or
bystanders.
20 Cal. 3d at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
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bility is merely to simplify proof under a fault-based standard of
liability,' or represents the abandonment of "fault" in favor of
some form of distributive justice. Many courts have said that the
decision to adopt strict liability was made so that manufacturers
would be liable for injuries associated with products because they
are best able to distribute those losses.'
IV. STRICT LIABILITY AND THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR FAULT
While the need to distribute the losses experienced by consumers
as a result of the injuries caused by the use of products lies at the
base of the system of strict liability, secondary loss distribution
aspects should remain secondary goals of a system of strict lia-
bility just as they do one of fault based liability. Primary loss re-
duction, that is, reducing the number of injuries caused by products,
should remain the foremost goal of any system of loss shifting
based upon an artificially created standard. And while the court
in Barker has strayed far from the negligence standard, it has, as
have the courts which preceded it, retained a reasonableness
standard to which a product's design must be compared before
liability can be imposed.
While the imposition of this standard of liability can be expected
to effect some economic hardship upon manufacturers of products
whose designs are allegedly responsible for injuries, much of the
economic hardship is an intended feature of primary loss reduc-
'" See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955
(1976); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
", This loss distribution rationale was stated in the concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944).
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and dis-
tributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
24 Cal. 2d at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 441. This sentiment was repeated by Justice
Traynor in the majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963): "The purpose
of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." See
also Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (1976)
(and cases cited therein), in which the court relies in part upon the availability of
insurance to the corporation to justify holding a successor corporation liable for
injuries caused by products manufactured by its predecessor.
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tion." This system of liability shifting should be distinguished from
no-fault proposals which advocate departure from the primary loss
reduction concepts of "fault" based liability in favor of efficient,
albeit totally non-fault vehicles for injury compensation. That is,
under strict liability the cost of compensating for injuries caused
by an injury-producing design should be borne by the manufacturer
who is responsible for that product." In theory, therefore, he has
an economic incentive to design a product which will not contain
a design "defect." Deterrence remains a goal of strict liability.
And although the standard of care is not that of a reasonable manu-
facturer, the design will be measured by its "reasonableness" con-
sidering all other factors.
As stated earlier, negligence as a standard of liability has a
dual purpose. The first purpose is reducing primary costs through
deterrence. The second purpose is reducing the secondary costs
of accidents by providing a means whereby the disabling effects of
the costs of compensating for those injuries may be reduced or
distributed. Thus, while the twin goals of fault based liability are
not always in conflict, as in a situation where injury producing
conduct can be deterred and efficient secondary loss distribution
achieved through the same standard of liability, a conflict develops
when deterrence is achieved only at the cost of poor secondary loss
distribution, or where a system of preferred secondary loss dis-
tribution is adopted at the expense of increased primary accident
costs.
Some commentators have suggested that a system of strict lia-
bility for product defects never presents such a conflict, since the
"To the extent that liability for the cost of compensating for injuries caused
by products which fall below the "standard" deters manufacturers from producing
such products and consequently reduces the number of injuries suffered, it is
the primary function.
Stressing that primary cost reduction cannot be effected by imposition of
liability upon parties who are not "deterred" from producing or marketing de-
fective products, the Alabama court in Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335
So.2d 134 (Ala. 1976), held that a retailer who purchased a defective product
from a reputable manufacturer would not be financially responsible for injuries
caused by defects in the product under the Alabama form of defective product
liability. 335 So.2d at 139. Of course, implied indemnity would accomplish the
same result, with the potential added benefit of insuring that retailers would be
available as parties defendant to insure that an injured party would have greater
recourse to available compensation. See Walkowiak, supra note 22, at 518. The
increased costs of administration of such a remedy, however, are critical draw-
backs of such a procedure.
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twin goals of the fault-based liability system are not frustrated and
the two goals are constantly in harmony. That is, the deterrence
aspect of ensuring that safer products are manufactured is pro-
moted by assessing liability against the manufacturers of these
products who are also in the best position to reduce the secondary
costs by spreading the costs of compensation for these injuries.
It has been assumed that the costs of compensating for injuries
caused by products in a strict liability system effect an increase
in the safety of the manufactured products to a level society finds
more acceptable, regardless of the standard by which the product
is measured, and that the only remaining question is whether the
secondary costs of compensating for the injuries are sufficiently
reduced.
It should be remembered that whether the system adopted is a
system of negligence or strict liability, there will be a level of
subsidization of every enterprise to the extent that some injuries
which are a direct product of that enterprise are not compensated
by the participants in the enterprise. The amount of that subsidy
varies with the social cost of the injuries which are caused by the
enterprise and which remain uncompensated. If the product manu-
facturer is in the best position to reduce primary costs and can also
efficiently distribute the costs of compensating for product caused
injuries over a large number of products (or if the liability insur-
ance system is an effective vehicle for spreading those losses tempo-
rally and between manufacturers), then both the specific deter-
rence' aspect and the secondary loss distribution aspect are
satisfied.
Fault-based liability is thought to reduce primary accident costs
in two ways. First, since every party may be held liable for injuries
caused by conduct which falls below a minimum standard of care,
each party is deterred from continuing in that fashion. Their in-
centive to discontinue such conduct is financial, since each party
will attempt to reduce their costs by reducing their expenditures
for the costs of compensation of injuries which they are assessed.
Since liability is conditioned upon fault the potential liability costs
are weighed against the potential economic value of continuing
91 Primary loss reduction can also be thought of as specific deterrence since
the manufacturer is theoretically "deterred" from manufacturing defective prod-
ucts through imposition of liability.
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the conduct. In order to be deterred, the actors must be aware of
the standard to which they are being held and be capable of meet-
ing that standard or be prepared to compensate for injuries caused
by breach of the standard." To the extent that the conduct causes
injuries for which there is no compensation, we can argue that
society is not prepared to make the decision to deter that conduct
because the benefits provided by that conduct to society exceed the
costs which it imposes upon society in terms of risk of uncom-
pensated injury. Second, to the extent that these costs are not re-
duced by deterring participating parties from conducting them-
selves in a particular fashion, the costs of injuries shall be borne
by the participating parties. The cost of the activity in which the
actor held liable is engaged is increased by the cost of compensat-
ing for the injuries caused by the "fault" based conduct of that
party. This is specific deterrence.
If specific deterrence is to function to reduce primary accident
costs for injuries caused by products, an effective system of allocat-
ing the costs of those risks must be fashioned. If it is, then the risk-
creating product will bear the costs of compensating for the in-
juries created by it, and its price consequently will be higher at
any given level of production. This higher price will represent the
cost of manufacture plus the surcharge added to the product's price
for the cost of compensating for the injuries which have been
caused by that product. The attractiveness of this product to the
consumer should decrease as its price is compared to the lower
costs of alternative products which have lower risks and conse-
quently lower surcharges for the costs of compensating for the
injuries produced by those products. As the attractiveness to the
consumer of the risk-creating product decreases, the volume of
production should also decrease and the potential economies of
" There is evidence that the small businessman is not very well informed re-
garding standards by which his products will be measured. The conclusion which
has been drawn from this evidence is that the small manufacturer's failure to be
deterred from designing a defective product is attributed to the misconception
that he will be absolutely liable for injuries caused by the product. It is closely
followed by an indictment of the trade associations and insurance industry for
failure to convey this information. Product Liability Insurance: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities of the House
Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. Part 3 at 240 (1977) (statement
of Anita Johnson) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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higher volume will be eliminated, so that the manufacturing cost
of the product will increase with lower volume.
If, however, as some suggest, in a system of strict liability in-
surance has the effect of distributing the costs of compensating
for injuries caused by products to the producers of products which
do not represent the same high risk of injury, then the manufacturers
of these lower risk products will be forced to bear some of the
expense of paying for the cost of compensating for risks and
consequently will be forced to raise the prices of their lower risk
products." This would especially be true for a test of liability to be
applied retrospectively such as that employed in the second prong
of the disjunctive test adopted by Barker in which actuarial credi-
bility is hampered by the lack of the benefit of hindsight. Con-
sumers will not be deterred from purchasing the products which
represent a higher risk since those products' prices will not fully
reflect the risks of injury which they present.'" Some of the costs
which that risk of injury creates will be borne by products which
do not represent as serious a risk of injury but which nevertheless
will bear a share of the cost of compensation for injuries and a
share of the costs of the administrative structure for determining
when the loss should be shifted. Hazardous products will lose their
unattractiveness to consumers since there will be no, or at least a
reduced, price differential. Although the costs of compensation will
be spread over a broader class of products, there will also be the
higher expectation on the part of the consumer that the risk of
injury for use of a hazardous product will be borne by the manu-
facturers of products. Consequently consumers will not be deterred
from purchasing products because of the fear that the financial
"At present the costs of liability insurance represent less than one percent
of our gross national product. When this cost is measured against the fact that
this payment transfers less than 20% of the premium dollar to the individuals
who do receive any compensation whatsoever, the inequity of the present system
of loss distribution for product covered injury seems manifest. I U.S. DEPT. OF
COM., INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, PRODUCT LIABILITY:
FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY 2-1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as INSUR-
ANCE STUDY].
1"The impact of "panic pricing" in liability insurance rating, of course, has
the effect of overpricing all goods subject to surcharge representing the costs of
liability insurance premiums. Cf. Hearings, supra note 98, at 870, 881-82 (state-
ment of Lester Rawls). The point is, however, that the higher risk product will
not bear its proportionate share of liability.
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impact of injuries caused by products will be borne by them.1"'
In a system of strict liability in which costs are not borne by risk
creating products, the consumer's financial incentive to seek a less-
hazardous alternative will be reduced. The demand for the risk-
creating product will increase at any given price if pricing factors
have an impact in the market, with a consequent increase in pri-
mary accident costs resulting from increased use of higher risk-
creating products." As primary accident costs increase, so will
the costs of insuring against those losses by even low-risk-creating
products." 3 Thus, the impact of a preferred secondary loss dis-
tribution vehicle may be the creation of increased primary accident
costs.
It is good public policy to shift losses to better loss distributors,
provided that other equally valid public policy considerations have
also been considered. There is an anomaly, however, in consider-
ing the public policy inherent in effective loss distribution in the
determination of whether a manufacturer should be liable for a
1' When the consumer expects to be compensated for injuries suffered while
using a product regardless of proof of "defect" or "fault," we are, of course, im-
posing a system of absolute liability. Thus, it has been argued that such a system
eliminates the disincentive to avoid risk taking with a consequent shift in loss
assumption. E.g., greater automobile safety in manufacture has caused greater
risk taking by drivers resulting in an increased incidence of pedestrian injuries.
See D. NORTH & R. MILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC ISSUES 33 (3d ed. 1976).
Justification for the imposition of liability in these cases has been found in the
assertion that such injuries are foreseeable (see, e.g., Larson v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104
(7th Cir. 1977)), and that the manufacturer is best able to spread the costs of
compensating for injuries caused by products. See CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccI-
DENTS 39-67 (1970).
102 Although the conclusions reached are not the same, this form of analysis of
spreading the cost of compensation was presented in Sachs, Negligence or Strict
Product Liability: Is There Really a Difference in Law or Economics?, 8 GA.J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 259 (1978). Professor Sachs concludes that the costs to con-
sumers will be affected by whether manufacturers or their insurers are lower cost
accident insurers and whether consumers would rather pay for the additional costs
by way of higher product costs or self insurance. Id. at 277. As noted, however,
a system of strict liability will deter manufacturers from allowing consumers to
make that choice, so that the lower cost option is not available; nor is a manufac-
turer likely to waive liability coverage in the absence of a strong economic reason
to do so unless liability insurance is unavailable.
10 If, as the Interagency Task Force report states, each dollar of insurance
premiums for product related injuries results in only 20 cents of compensation to
the injured victims of products containing defects, then it can be expected that
the administrative costs in passing this compensation on to those parties will be
spread among the class of insured, some of whom may not represent the same
threat of injury. INSURANCE STUDY supra note 99, at 2-1.
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product design choice while at the same time not considering
countervailing public policy considerations such as primary deter-
rence.' Imposition of the test of reasonableness, as is done by even
such radical decisions as Barker v. Lull,"' should also permit fur-
therance of those countervailing public policy considerations within
that system of liability in order for it to function within the over-
all system of tort loss distribution.
It has taken the form of an article of faith that manufacturers
can spread the losses from injuries which persons suffer from use
of their products through insurance or increased costs for future
products."' Certain industry publications, however, challenge the
proposition that future cost increases can accommodate the high
cost of present damage awards.1'0 And while the Interagency Task
Force'"' report stated that no unavailability of product liability in-
surance presently exists, they acknowledged that the high cost of
insurance in some industries may make it functionally (economic-
ally) unavailable, thereby driving certain enterprises into elimi-
nating certain products or "going bare."'' . If the uninsurable
product is no longer produced, other alternative products will face
greater demand with what would be expected to constitute a higher
subsequent price as demand increases notwithstanding production
economies. The pass-on costs of the product's "covered" injuries
would likewise result in higher product costs. The result of a manu-
facturer "going bare" will quite evidently be a reduction in the
104 In similar fashion, Professor Sachs seems to assume that economic efficiency
is the primary goal for any system of accident compensation, apparently ignoring
the first justification for any system of loss shifting, that is, primary accident cost
reduction. Although he acknowledges that one justification for a system of strict
liability is the impact of such a system upon safer product development, he dis-
counts the impact which such a system will have. Sachs, supra note 102, at 275-76.
Professors Calabresi and Hirschoff, on the other hand, argue quite persuasively
that specific deterrence will be replaced by "general" deterrence in a system of
strict liability with a consequent total reduction in injuries. See generally Calabresi
& Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1056-78,
1082-84 (1972).
"'20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
"0' See note 94 supra.
107 See SPORTING GOODS MANUFACTURERS ASS'N, THE NAKED TRUTH ABOUT
SPORTS AND THE LAW (undated); AMERICAN MACHINE TOOL DISTRIB. Ass'N,
A STATE LEGISLATORS GUIDE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY PROBLEMS 1 (1977).
'"INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 99.
"0' Id. at 3-14.
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available pool of assets from which an injured consumer may expect
compensation for injuries and thus even the preferred system of
secondary loss distribution may be adversely affected.
From the consumer's point of view, the result in any of these
cases is a higher product cost. This is true whether the costs are
the result of added precautions in the way of inspections or "safety
features," or the pass-on costs of insurance. These higher costs are
present even though a consumer might have preferred to have
assumed the risk attendant in a certain product in exchange for
a reduced product cost, or because the availability and cost of a
first person form of insurance was preferable to the consumer.1 '
The notion that everyone should pay a little and that an individ-
ual suffering a large personal injury loss should not be forced to
bear the total impact of that loss has a definite moral appeal. 1' No-
where in tort law has this notion taken a more forceful hold upon
the justification for a particular theory of liability than it has in
manufacturer's strict liability.11 ' The conclusion that the manufac-
turer is in the best position to absorb these costs or to pass them on
in the form of higher costs in individual products due to higher in-
surance premiums has taken on the appearance of an article of
faith virtually beyond peradventure. If they cannot pass on the
costs of insurance or injury compensation, it is argued then that
the manufacturer's profits will be reduced as they "absorb" those
costs. The first question that should be addressed, however, is
whether the imposition of liability will effect an overall reduction
or increase in the total number of injuries to be secondarily spread.
110 See Sachs, supra note 102.
12 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 759-64 (1956). It has its analogue
in economic theory in that the advantages of taking a small sum of money from
one person would result in less serious economic dislocation, and therefore, lower
secondary or avoidable losses; and in the theory that a small loss from a large
number of people is preferable to a large loss from a single person since "people
feel they suffer less if 10,000 of them lose $1.00 than if one loses $10,000." Cala-
bresi & Hirschoff, supra note 104; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517 (1961). That this exists as the
fundamental social justification for permitting a defendant to spread liability
through liability insurance in a system in which fault deterrence is a principal
concern has been expressed elsewhere. See Walkowiak, supra note 22.
"1' See cases cited in note 94 supra.
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CONCLUSION
The theory of strict liability for injuries caused by defective
products has evolved to a point where important questions concern-
ing its function as a rule of loss distribution need to be answered.
As first applied to cases of manufacturing defects, the strict liability
theory was closely tied to the traditional reasonableness standard
of conduct. In this context, the loss distribution functions of strict
liability, both as a tool of primary loss reduction and secondary
loss spreading, were not markedly different from those of the tradi-
tional standard of negligence or "fault." As applied in manufactur-
ing defect cases, in fact, the rule of strict liability can be viewed
to a large extent as one of proof; plaintiffs were benefitted pri-
marily by a presumption or imputation of knowledge to the manu-
facturer, with the manufacturer's conduct in marketing the product
then measured against the familiar standard of reasonableness. The
same analysis applies to cases of inadvertent design defect.
When applied to cases of conscious design choice, however, the
rule of strict liability may have very different implications. Start-
ing with the hypotheses that the manufacturer did know of the
risk involved, and did not act unreasonably in designing the product
as he did, the question arises whether the manufacturer has deviated
from any standard of conduct which society imposes. The answer
of the courts has been that they are not concerned with the manu-
facturer's conduct, but with the condition of the product itself.
This, however, overlooks what should be the primary goal of any
rule of tort law: reduction of losses through the deterrent effect of
the imposition of liability. It is only conduct which can be deterred;
no court has yet suggested that products themselves are subject to
the deterrent effect of money judgments. A rule of liability which
cannot be linked to "faulty" conduct, even through the use of
fictions, must be subject to doubt so far as its deterrent effect and
efficacy as a primary loss reducer are concerned.
In the conscious design choice cases, then, the predominance
of secondary loss spreading-"deep pocket" law-as a basis for
strict liability becomes clearly apparent. It is possible, however,
that by permitting losses to be spread too broadly, the combination
of strict liability and insurance actually has a perverse effect on
the goal of primary loss reduction. There is no "faulty" conduct
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from which the manufacturer can be deterred, and neither the
manufacturer nor the consumer expects to bear the full cost of
product-related injury. In short, there may be very little incentive
for the manufacturer to produce, or for the consumer to seek out,
products which pose lesser risks of injury. Losses are well dis-
tributed, but there may be more losses than are necessary under
a system of primary loss reduction through liability shifting. If the
system of compensation for these injuries was economically effi-
cient, criticism of it as a system of loss distribution would be mis-
placed. Since it is not efficient or fair, however, its justification must
lie in its effectiveness as a primary loss reducer.
This is not to suggest a wholesale abandonment of the strict
liability theory. To the contrary, it works well in cases of manu-
facturing flaws and inadvertent design errors, and in those contexts
appears consistent with both the primary and secondary loss dis-
tribution goals of the tort law system. The problem of conscious
design choices, however, points up clearly the limits of the theory,
especially with respect to primary loss deterrence and reduction.
Extension of the strict liability theory to these cases should be
accompanied by a serious inquiry into the standard of conduct
thereby imposed on manufacturers, and into the desirability of
placing some limitation on the ability of defendants to spread their
losses to the manufacturers of safer products and to the public in
general, or into the abandonment of an inefficient system of liability
shifting in favor of a more direct system of compensation.
